Cybersecurity Metrics for Enhanced Protection of Healthcare IT Systems by Ahmed, Y. et al.
Cybersecurity Metrics for Enhanced Protection of
Healthcare IT Systems
Yussuf Ahmed Syed Naqvi Mark Josephs
School of Computing and Digital Technology, Birmingham City University, UK
Abstract—Cybersecurity incidents are on the rise in the health-
care sector and it is becoming a growing concern for the senior
executives. The attack surface is expanding due to the large
number of connected medical devices and the proliferation of
portable devices such as smart phones, tablets and USB devices.
In this paper, we will discuss some of the security challenges
facing this sector and propose a set of cybersecurity metrics that
could be used to enhance the protection of the IT systems.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, Healthcare, Interconnected de-
vices, Network security, Security metrics, Medical devices, In-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The need for interconnected devices in healthcare settings
has become a necessity given the number of clinicians and
other healthcare professionals who need access to the patient
information in order to deliver a good quality patient care
and to avoid duplication. While Interconnecting these devices
brings lots of benefits, it also introduces security issues that
could compromise the privacy and integrity of the data [1].
Security metrics can provide organisations with a mean to
measure and understand the security status of their systems
given attackers are always looking for the weakest link [2].
Clinicians and other healthcare professionals might not see
security from the same perspective as IT professionals and
are mainly driven by the need to deliver excellent patient care
[3]. Security metrics can help stakeholders to learn about the
insight and trends in their organisation and to measure how the
organisation is performing against their peers in the industry
[4]. The healthcare sector had numerous security breaches
over the last few years and the trend has been increasing.
According to a recent Verizon data report, the number of
security breaches in the healthcare sector has substantially
increased from the previous year and 85 percent of the
malware targeting this industry is Ransomware [5]. A similar
report by the SecuritySecorecard found the lack of security
awareness training among staff in the healthcare sector which
is putting the entire infrastructure at risk [6]. The healthcare
sector faces some unique challenges given the vast amount of
sensitive data they hold, the ageing infrastructure especially
in public hospitals and complexity due to the large number
of endpoints [7]. The industry as a whole also lags behind in
security compared to the other sectors and must improve their
security in order to protect their key assets [8].
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II covers healthcare exposure to cyber threats. Section
III presents security metrics including the proposed metrics
categorisations and the relevant sub-metrics. Finally, Section
IV concludes the paper with a summary and future work.
II. HEALTHCARE EXPOSURE TO CYBER THREATS
The biggest threat to the healthcare sector is attacks on the
healthcare infrastructure, services and medical devices which
can compromise the safety of patients [9]. Availability and
correctness are key factors that are critical to the delivery of
a healthcare service but these are threatened by hackers who
are always looking for vulnerable systems to target. Hackers
are attracted to the healthcare sector due to the value of the
sensitive data they hold and ease of the target [10].
The healthcare sector shares most of the threat vectors with
other industries however the impact of a compromise is much
higher given it involves the safety of patients. Priya et al.
[11] described some of the security attacks that are targeted
at healthcare systems and the challenges they pose to the
security, integrity and availability of sensitive data. The authors
characterised the security attacks into three phases which are:
the data gathering phase, network gathering phase and Storage
phase. There are a large number of wireless devices connected
to the hospital networks but while these devices help clinicians
and other healthcare professionals to deliver effective patient
care, they also increase the attacks surface [12].
Ransomware is a category of malware that encrypts user
data to extort money and is often referred to a digital form of
blackmail [13], [14]. Ransomware is one of the most popular
attacks that has widely been used against the healthcare sector
in the recent years. The WannaCry incident which affected the
UK National Health Service showed the impact of such attacks
on a critical infrastructure. WannaCry exploited a known
Server Message Block(SMB) vulnerability [15]. Ransomware
attackers are usually interested in extorting money from their
victims by encrypting their files and affecting availability
of the data but a recent ransomware attack on the offices
of a Podiatric specialist was reported to have corrupted or
modified 24000 patient records [16]. Attackers usually deceive
innocent victims by sending them links to click which then
downloads the Ransomware malware to their systems but they
also use methods such as drive-by freeware [17]. Ransomware
has become the preferred choice for cybercriminals due to
its ease of use, availability of the Ransomware toolkits and
decentralised cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [18], [19]. In
the case of UK NHS, the WannaCry ransomware spread
quickly from one system to another affecting over 50,000
machines at its peak [20]. In the following sub-sections, we
will cover some the reasons why the healthcare sector is
susceptible to cyberattacks.
A. Ageing infrastructure
The threat landscape is constantly changing and organisa-
tions have to be well prepared to maintain business continuity
if their critical services are affected by cyberattacks but the
healthcare sector and especially public hospitals are known to
be using legacy systems which are vulnerable to cyberattacks.
The WannaCry incident which almost brought part of the UK
National Health Service to standstill is one example where
unsupported systems introduced threats to the organisation.
WannaCry was the largest Ransomware ever seen having
affected 11 countries in just three hours [21]. Ransomware
attacks continued to target the healthcare sector while Phishing
and misconfiguration resulted in a large number security
breaches [22]. Patch management is one area that is not
fully implemented due to the ageing systems which are no
longer supported by the vendors or for fear of the updates
breaking this critical systems [23]. Privacy and security is a
major concern in health institutions due to the vast amount of
sensitive data they hold [24]. Several authors have discussed
the adaptation of Cloud computing in Healthcare to overcome
some of the challenges posed by the ageing infrastructure
however Cloud computing has it own privacy and security
issues which is why some providers are hesitant to embrace
the Cloud paradigm [25], [26], [27], [28].
B. Medical devices
Medical devices that were previously not connected to the
internet are nowadays online to ease data sharing amongst
clinicians and to provide result promptly. However, these
medical devices will also inevitably introduce vulnerabilities
to the network and increase the attack surface [29]. The manu-
facturers of these medical devices did not usually have security
in mind when they were designed. Vulnerable medical devices
could be an entry point for hackers to attack the hospital
network [30] .The presence of malware on computer systems
can significantly affect the security of the medical devices.
These days medical devices are connected to computers to
allow health professionals to share medical diagnosis such as
ultrasound results instantly but these can mean malware being
transferred from one system and another and eventually to the
wider hospital network [31].
The US Food and Drug Administration ( FDA) provided
guidelines for hospital and healthcare networks in relation
to securing medical devices and healthcare networks. Mea-
sures such as restricting unauthorised access for both med-
ical devices and hospital networks, implementing network
monitoring to detect intrusions, cyber hygiene, capability to
set medical devices to fails-safe and sharing medical devices
vulnerabilities with manufacturers were proposed [32]. The
FDA also released a final post market management of medical
devices during the whole lifecycle and stresses the need
to perform risk assessments to determine exploitability and
impact on patient health and evaluate risk to patient safety.
[33]
The current Common Vulnerability Scoring System(CVSS)
does not often take clinical environments into account and
a common framework for security and safety of this devices
will go along way in addressing some of these challenges
[30]. The ISO 80001 standards on the application of risk
management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices
provides guidance on security and risk management for health-
care organisations but its effectiveness in dealing with modern
and complex cybersecurity challenges is unknown [34].
Compromised medical devices do not just introduce risks to
the network and they can also have serious effect on patient’s
health [35]. For example a misconfiguration of medical devices
such as X-ray machines by attackers could expose patients
to serious risks [36]. Similarly there are a large number of
Internet of Things (IOT) smart devices such as insulin pumps
that could be compromised by attackers given they connect to
wireless networks to upload to their data to the network. A sur-
vey by Deloitte which involved 17 hospitals in the Netherlands
reported that there was an increase in the number of medical
devices that were interconnected and more than half of the
participants reported their medical devices were infected with
viruses [31]. Wellington et al. [37] discussed common cyber
attack methods against medical devices and categorised them
into 3 categories: Unauthorised access, DoS/DDoS attacks and
Malware attacks.
C. Security culture
Security awareness training is often regarded as one the best
security measures given humans could be susceptible to social
engineering and become the weakest link on the network for
attackers to exploit. Clinicians and other healthcare profession-
als are often driven by the need to deliver excellent patient
care and security controls such as strong passwords could be
been as a hinderance rather than a security measure hence why
password sharing was found to be prevalent in the healthcare
sector [3]. Sharing passwords not only introduces security risks
but it can have serious impact on patient safety due to the
possibility of a mixup and subsequent doctors updating the
wrong patient information or using a medical device with a
customised settings for a previous patient by mistake [38].
The healthcare sector will need to employ senior security
officers to oversee the Cybersecurity side of the business
including the user awareness training. The UK National Health
Service recently created a new post of Chief Information
Security Officer (CISO) following on the lessons learnt from
the WannaCry Ransomware attacks [39].
D. Legal and regulatory compliance
Hospital executives must ensure they have appropriate se-
curity measures in place to protect the data they hold. Such
security measures include encryption, data sanitisation and
appropriate access control mechanisms in order to restrict
access to only those who are authorised. The senior managers
should also educate their employees on the consequences of
accessing patients information without any valid reason and
appropriate actions should be taken against those who misuse
their privileges. A healthcare administrator was recently fined
in the UK for accessing patients records without a valid reason
[40].
There are several laws and regulations that protect the
privacy and confidentiality of patients. For example, in the
UK along with the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR)
compliance requirement, there is also the Caldicott report
which sets out six principles for organisations to follow
in order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of their
patients [41]. The National Data Guardian (NDG) challenges
healthcare organisation to ensure the data of their patients
is securely protected and properly used [42]. In the US the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
regulates the security and privacy of data held by healthcare
providers [43].
E. Summary
In this section, we described some of the security challenges
facing the healthcare sector and the motivations of the cyber-
criminals. We mentioned some of the reasons why healthcare
institutions are susceptible to cyberattacks including the vast
number legacy systems, softness of the target and the value of
the data they hold.
In the next section, we will provide a brief overview of
security metrics and present metrics that could be used to
protect the healthcare IT systems. The proposed metrics could
also be used in any other industry however these metrics will
contribute immensely to improving the security of healthcare
IT systems given this sector’s susceptibility to cyberattacks
and the risk such attacks pose to patient safety. The security of
these systems will need to be monitored in a more meaningful
manners and quantifying these metrics will assist IT security
professional to put in place the right controls for mitigating
potential risks.
The proposed security metric categories could also be
quantified to help senior managers make informed decision
including investments on security measures. It is worth not-
ing that the SMB vulnerability exploited by WannaCry was
known for three months and having security metrics such as
percentage of systems with known vulnerabilities that have not
be patched, could have been very useful and maybe resulted
in preemptive actions being taken to avoid the risk.
III. SECURITY METRICS
Security metrics has been gaining interest from researchers
in academia and the industry to help quantify security mea-
surements and assist with decision making. According to
a recent report by Thycotic, most organisation are failing
to implement cybersecurity metrics and therefore unable to
evaluate and track the effectiveness and performance of their
security mechanisms [44]. Several authors have published
work on security metrics [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51]
but these were mainly targeted at organisational level and not
captured in the context of healthcare IT systems.
Ahmed et al. [52] conducted a review of security metrics
and proposed a reference architecture for aggregating the
security of an enterprise network. Jafari et al. [53] discussed
security metrics in e-health and proposed an approach that
consists of five elements; technology maturity analysis, threat
analysis and modelling, requirements establishment, policies
and mechanisms, and system behaviour but the method for
developing the metrics was not described.
Liu et al. [54] focused on the implementation of IPSec to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive patient data
from cyber threats and demonstrated how to implement the
controls. Abie and Balasingham [55] proposed a risk based
adaptive security framework for IOT in eHealth that allows
systems to learn and adopt to changes in the environments
by anticipating threats. Savola et. [4] performed risk analysis
on an e-health self-care system and quantified the metrics
using risk assessments technique based on severity and im-
pact. Muthukrishnan et al. [56] proposed a quantitative and
qualitative metrics maturity method based on a scorecard.
In the following sub-sections, we present some security
metrics that could be used to address the cybersecurity chal-
lenges discussed in the previous section and describe how
these metrics could be used to improve the security of the
IT systems.
We believe the metric categories we are proposing have a
wider coverage and could be used to measure and improve
the security status of the IT systems including interconnected
devices. Although these metrics could be applied to any
organisation, we believe their positive impact will be felt more
in the healthcare sector where the attack surface is much larger
due the vast number of legacy systems, interconnected medical
devices, complexity of the endpoints, security culture and the
high value of the data they hold.
In fig. 1, we categorised the security metrics into eight
groups which are: Indicators of compromise, indicators of
attacks, resilience, red and blue teaming, vulnerability as-
sessment, intelligence driven defence, risk assessment and
penetration testing. In the following sub-sections, we will
describe each of the categories in more detail.
A. Indicators Of Compromise based metrics (IOC)
Indicators of compromise are information that can used
to identify malicious activities that has taken place on a
system or network [57]. The information relating to these
security breaches can be used to prevent similar attacks in
the future. Monitoring for indicators of compromise can help
organisations to quickly detect incidents that may have been
missed by the monitoring tools.
Incidents such as malware attacks often take along time
before they are detected by the affected organisations or by the
security community and by that time lots of sensitive data may
have been stolen [58]. Once the IOCs are detected and shared,
organisation could act on these indictors to mitigate the risks
and prevent future attacks. Sharing cybersecurity intelligence
such as Indictors of compromise could allow organisations to
defend against sophisticated cyberattacks [59]. For example,
in the case of WannaCry, there were three IOCs which were
detected following on the first wave of attacks. One of this
was a dropper which contained the ransomware and used to
run it while the other two were encryption plug-ins [60].
Data relating to indicators of compromise such as artefacts
that are left after malware executions could be obtained from
the logs files. Monitoring tools such as anti-virus systems
are known to use indictors of compromise to block malware.
Tounsi at al. [61] categorised indicators of compromise into
Network-based indicator (IP addresses, Urls and Domain
names), Host-based indicators (malware names, signature and
registry keys ) and email-based indicators (source IP, header,
attacked link).
There are free tools such as Redline from FireEye which
can be used to perform indicators of compromise analysis
on systems [62]. Other web-based tools such as IOC Bucket
[63] and IOC editor [64] can be used to share, research,
create and edit IOCs. Catakoglu et al. [65] proposed an
automated technique for collecting indicators of compromise
from webpages in a honeypot setup.
Metrics based on IOC could assist IT professionals includ-
ing those in healthcare to learn more about the security threats
affecting their systems and to use the lessons learnt to prevent
future attacks. In the next points. we will mention some useful
metrics relating to IOC and point out how they could be used
by security professionals to enhance the protection of their
systems.
• Volume of outbound traffic. unusual increase in outgoing
traffic could be a sign of data exfiltration [66]. Organ-
isations have a responsibility to protect their sensitive
data and any breach is likely to attract attention from
the government bodies with responsibilities for enforcing
the data protection laws such as GDPR.
The large volume of personal data held by the healthcare
providers is one the reasons why the cybercriminals target
this sector. Using this indicator of compromise will allow
healthcare IT professionals to look for incidents that may
have been missed by the security monitoring tools. It is
paramount that IT professional correlate log data from
affected systems and the other network monitoring tools
to determine exactly what happened including the type
of malware.
• Volume and number of IP addresses connecting to your
network from outside of your geographical area. Suc-
cessful logins from outside your region could be an
indication of a security breach. Given the complexity of
the endpoints and the legacy systems that are still in use in
the healthcare institutions especially in public hospitals,
there are more chances of breaches not being detected
compared to other sectors such as the financial sector.
Hunting for indictors of compromise such as external
IP addresses from outside of your normal geographical
area could allow the IT security professionals to find
out whether successful login was established and to
investigate the incidents further.
• Number of simultaneous logins by the same user from
different locations that has not been detected by the
network security tools. This could be an indication of
sophisticated attacks that bypassed the security controls.
Investigating this IOC will help IT security professional
to determine the chain of events that led to this breach
and to fine tune their security controls to help detect or
prevent similar attacks in the future.
• Percentage of traffic from onion router that was not
detected by the network monitoring tools. This metrics
can be used to test the effectiveness of your security
control [67]. Cybercriminal are known to disguise their
identity by moving data across multiple Tor nodes making
it difficult to trace back their activity. IT security teams
should ensure this metrics is monitored and appropriate
security measures taken to mitigate risk associated with
it.
• Number of unknown accounts with elevated privileges
found on compromised systems. This may be an in-
dication that the systems were compromised and that
the attacker performed escalation of privileges to take
ownership and create backdoors.
B. Indicators Of Attack Metrics
Indicator Of Attack (IOA) is a proactive security measure
that could be used to reveal an attack that is taking place
before the indicators of compromise become visible [68].
IOAs could help organisations to disrupt attackers before they
exploit the systems by putting in place mitigating controls.
For example, IOAs could be used to prevent attacks such as
Phishing and ransomware which has become a popular attack
vector targeted at healthcare providers. Implementing IOAs
metrics such as those shown below, could help organisations
to increase their proactive approaches and prevent attacks that
could have otherwise compromised their systems.
• Lateral movements. This could indicate an attacker has
gained access to the network and is moving from one
vulnerable host to another until the goal is achieved
[69]. Due to the complexity of the setup and number
of interconnected devices in healthcare institutions, IT
security professionals will need to monitor this metric to
enable them to act promptly and implement corrective
measures to disrupt such activity.
• High Bandwidth and increased outgoing traffic. This
could be a sign of DDoS attack or data exfiltration [70]
• Number of hosts communicating with external networks
on non-standard ports. This could be an indication of
sophisticated attackers hiding their activities. An attacker
could use non-standard port numbers to avoid detection
by the security controls. Monitoring this metric could
help security professionals to stop unauthorised connec-
tions and to update the secure measures.
• High number of failed authentication attempts. This could
be an indication of an attacker attempting to gain access
to your network using brute-force.
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• Number of processes with high memory consumption.
This could be an indication that malware is being exe-
cuted. Malware usually runs on the memory and security
professionals should investigate spikes in memory usage
to determine whether malware execution is taking place.
C. Risk Assessment Metrics
Understanding what needs to be protected is the first step
in the risk assessment process. Asset identification and classi-
fication will need to be performed in order direct resources to
the most critical assets. The healthcare institutions hold lots of
sensitive data relating to their patients and it is important for
all assets to be accounted for and their impact on the business
quantified. A risk register should be maintained and populated
with risks that were identified along with any corrective
measures taken and should be regularly updated. Organisation
can use security metrics to maintain oversight on their risk
management processes. Such metrics include:
• Percentage of risks with severe or critical rating. This
will help to prioritise and direct resources to deal with
the most urgent threats affecting the critical assets. The
healthcare sector especially public hospitals have limited
resources and monitoring this metrics will enable them
to prioritise and deal with risks with highest severity.
• Percentage of key assets with no ownership assigned. As-
set ownership is key to determining the right safeguards
needed to protect these systems. Given the ever changing
threat landscape and the presence of legacy systems in
the healthcare sector, it is just a matter of time before
such systems are compromised. Resuming services and
invoking recovery plans for such systems depends on the
assets owner if the system is to be restored with limited
downtime. Organisations should ensure all assets have an
owner.
• Percentage of assets that are monitored. This metric will
help with monitoring the coverage and determine if gaps
exist. Considering how critical some of these systems are
to service delivery and their complexity in healthcare
setting, efforts should be made to ensure coverage is
maximised.
D. Penetration Testing Metric
Penetration testing is a method for detecting security vulner-
abilities on a network and can involve simulated attacks [71].
Due to the costs involved, organisations have the tendency to
perform penetration testing on quarterly or biannually basis but
the threat landscape could change very quickly and make such
tests redundant within a short period. To fill this gap, newer
penetration testing tools that operate inside the network have
been developed by companies. For example Firedrill developed
the AttackIQ [72] which is a tool that performs automated
testing to determine the enterprise security posture but these
tools are not yet widely adopted. Healthcare institutions have
a large attack surface due to the vast number of endpoints and
legacy systems. Performing regular penetration testing on these
systems will enable the organisations to detect weaknesses and
implement the necessary controls to prevent potential attacks.
One way to maximise these tests is to use penetration testing
metrics. Such metrics include but not limited to:
• Percentage of penetration tests that discovered high risks.
This can indicate a measure of how well the existing
security controls are performing including the detection
capability of the vulnerability management tools.
• Penetration testing intervals. The threat landscape
changes over time and increasing the frequency of testing
will help organisations to uncover security risks and help
prevent potential attacks. It can also be used to measure
how well vulnerabilities detected in the previous tests
were resolved.
• Penetration testing coverage. In healthcare settings, the
coverage metric should include all critical systems such
as medical devices and the infrastructure. Ideally, all
assets should be covered.
• Mean Time To Fix (MTTF). This metrics will show the
average time taken to fix the vulnerabilities that were
identified during the penetration testing and also allow
senior managers to measure the capability and average
response times of the technical teams.
E. Vulnerability Assessment Metric
Vulnerability is a weakness on a system that could be
exploited by a threat [73]. where possible organisations should
be implementing automated vulnerability scanning tools to
enable them to detect vulnerabilities more efficiently and in a
consistent manner. System administrators should monitor and
deal with the detected vulnerabilities promptly according their
severity and impact. The vulnerability assessment tools are
likely to detect large number of vulnerabilities in healthcare
institutions such as public hospitals. One ways to maximise
the effectiveness of the response is to use vulnerability metrics
and such metrics include:
• Percentage of critical systems with known vulnerabilities
that are not patched. This metric will help organisations
to determine how well they are implementing their secu-
rity patches. Systems with known vulnerabilities face a
higher risks given this information is publicly available
on the vulnerability databases. The SMB vulnerability
which was exploited by the WannaCry ransomware is
one example of known vulnerabilities which could have
been prevented with a simple patch.
• Meantime To Detection (MTD). This metric will enable
organisations to test how well vulnerabilities are detected
including the effectiveness of their vulnerability manage-
ment systems and other security controls.
• Exposure time. This is the duration between detection
and application of the patch and could be used to mea-
sure how quickly the system administrators are applying
patches. The earlier the patch is applied the better.
F. Red and Blue Teaming Metric
Red teaming is a simulated form of attack in which skilled
teams attempt to penetrate the security defences and compro-
mise the systems. Organisations usually employ the service of
red teams in order to test the maturity of their security controls
[74]. After the end of the red team assessment, organisations
will have a list of attack vectors they are vulnerable to and
corrective measures to mitigate such risks.
Red teams should be complemented with Blue teams whose
role is to defend against the attacks and bolster the security
defences. The purpose of a Blue team is to defend the
organisation against both Red teams and real attackers [75].
Enlisting the service of Red teams can be expensive and
organisations should try to maximise this potential to improve
their security.
Red and Blue teams could also be used during the op-
timisation stages after new security programs are deployed.
Organisations can use metrics to measure how well they
are integrating the outcome from the Red team assessment
to improve the strength of their security mechanisms. Such
metrics include:
• Resources required to breach the security defences and
compromise the systems. This will indicate how well
the systems are protected and the layers of defence. The
security defences should be strong enough withstand most
attacks and the more resources required to break in the
better the defence mechanisms.
• Skills and knowledge of the attackers. This metric can
be used to determine the expertise and sophistication
required to break into the systems and the information
obtained from this metric could be used to increase the
security strength.
• Profiling the attacker. System administrators could use
honey-nets to build an overall picture of the attacker. This
metric could be used to put in place mitigation controls
and to beef the defensive capabilities.
G. Resilience Metric
Resilience is the ability for a system to adapt and con-
tinue to provide functionality in face of an attack [76]. The
healthcare sector experienced vast number of targeted attacks
which disrupted critical services as seen with the WannaCry
attack on the UK National Health Service(NHS). Ransomware
attacks such as WannaCry encrypts the files and make them
unavailable to the users until a ransom is paid. Resilience will
enable organisations to withstand adversarial attacks and to
ensure continuity of critical services [77]. The following are
some of the metrics that could be used to measure resilience
in an organisation.
• Mean Time To Repair ( MTTR). This metric will en-
able systems administrators to monitor how quickly they
respond to incidents that disrupts availability of their
critical resources and restore the service to normality. In
healthcare, unavailability of critical resources can have
serious impact on patient health. During the WannaCry
attack, the affected NHS hospital had to cancel lifesaving
operations and in some cases divert ambulances to far
away hospitals that were not affected by the ransomware
[39].
• Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). This metric could be
used to measure the resilience of the systems in terms of
the frequency and length of time between failures [78].
Reliability of systems is critical to most organisation but
it is more so in the healthcare sector given the number of
legacy systems in use and impact it will have on service
delivery.
• Availability of offline and tested backups. This metric
could be used to measure the reliability of the backups.
Sometime backup might be the only option to restore
services in some cases such as ransomware attacks.
Organisation with a tested offline backup are less likely to
end up with encrypted backup given malware developer
are known to target online back to force victims to meet
their demands [79].
H. Intelligence Driven Defence Metric
Cyberthreat intelligence is gaining popularity due to its
proactive approach. Security professionals are using threat
intelligence to learn more about intruders who are targeting
their industry [80]. Threat intelligence usually depends on
the existence of a vulnerability and the availability of a
threat that could exploits the weakness [81]. There are several
threat intelligence models that are widely used in the industry
including the Cyber-kill chain, Diamond model, OWASP and
Attack graphs [82]. The cyber-kill chain is intelligence driven
defence approach that could be used to prevent attacks by
disrupting the attackers activities at any of the seven stages
described in the model [83]. The Diamond model allows secu-
rity professionals to understand the behaviour and capabilities
of the intruder and has four features which are: Infrastructure,
capability, adversary and victim [84]. The Cyber-kill chain
could be used to quickly determine the severity of attacks by
mapping events produced by the various sensors. For example
events from a Host Intrusion Prevention Systems(HIPS) could
mean the attacker has gone past the early stage of the attack
process and is on the installation or exploitation stage, there-
fore a high priority will need to be assigned to deal with such
attack [85]. Examples of threat intelligence metrics that could
be used to enhance protection are:
• Threat intelligence teams. This metric could be used
to measure the technical resource capability. In-house
threat intelligence teams can go through the internal and
external threat intelligence databases and remove any
false positives [86].
• Number of known threats groups targeting your organi-
sation or sector at any given time. This metric could be
used to measure how well you are capable of dealing
with threats from these communities. Historical data
could be used to analyse their pattern of behaviour. The
data relating to these groups could be obtained from in-
house intelligence teams or from vendors and security
community at large.
• Number of attacks detected and mitigated using the attack
models such as the Cyberkill chain. This could be an
indication of how well your threat intelligence teams are
performing. Information from such metric could be used
to also protect your organisation from future attacks as
part of lesson learnt.
• Access to vendor threat intelligence report directly related
to your organisation. Vendors have huge capabilities and
resources including threats sharing with their industry
partners. Having access to these threats intelligence feeds
will provide your organisation with an edge over the
attackers.
• Metric from Indicators of Compromise(IOC). These met-
ric was discussed in the sub-section above.
• Knowledge of online forums where exploits are sold or
discussed. This metric will not only show how active your
security teams are, but it is also one of the best ways to
find how the threat actors are sharing newer techniques
to exploit vulnerabilities.
I. Summary
In the security metrics section we categorised the metrics
into eight different categories that could be used to calculate
the security of the systems and to help decision-makers
to make informed judgements. We discussed the challenges
facing the healthcare sector and believe these metrics could
help mitigate some of these cyber risks by strengthening the
security defence mechanisms and instilling proactive security
culture in these institutions.
Although these metrics could be used in any organisation,
they are also well suited to healthcare environments where the
complexity of the endpoints is high and the attack surface is
larger due to presence of legacy systems and interconnected
medical devices. These metrics will give visibility of the
overall security once quantified and will also allow system
administrators to react more quick to close loopholes. Metrics
such as those for Red teaming could also be used during the
optimisation stages after new security programs are deployed
by testing the security defences of these systems.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed the security challenges facing the
healthcare sector and provided some of the reason why this
sector is susceptible to cyber attacks. Cyberattack is an issue
affecting all industries and it is not just unique to the healthcare
but the impact is far greater given it involves patient safety. The
vulnerabilities of medical devices, infrastructure and security
culture were discussed. Finally a cybersecurity metrics for
enhancing the protection of these systems was proposed. The
metrics were grouped into IOC, IOA, Penetration testing ,
Red and Blue teaming, Risk assessment, Resilience and Intel-
ligence driven defence. Future work will involve quantifying
and aggregating these metrics to provide a higher level view of
the security status of the networked systems including medical
devices and other connected system.
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